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Ethereum’s Glamsterdam schedule hinges on smart-contract compatibility review

As reported on November 20, 2026, Ethereum developers had not decided whether to change the specifications for Glamsterdam, a planned hard fork intended to increase network capacity and efficiency. The choice could move mainnet activation from as early as mid-January 2027 to as late as May 2027.

The review concerns EIP-8037 and EIP-8038, proposals to change gas pricing. ChainSecurity warned in October that the changes could disrupt existing smart contracts and potentially expose them to exploitation. Developers subsequently postponed the Hoodi testnet fork, which had been scheduled for October 26. Researchers identified 13 real-world examples of potentially affected contracts in October; a November investigation examined eight smart-contract invariants that the upgrade could disrupt. These findings describe compatibility risks, not confirmed exploitation.

At the November 19 All Core Developers meeting, developers said the Ethereum Foundation, ChainSecurity and Dedaub had collectively contacted at least 50 affected companies. Three projects were classified as high impact, with fixes completed or expected by mid-December. Medium-impact projects reported timelines extending to January 10.

Ethereum’s Glamsterdam schedule hinges on smart-contract compatibility review

Developers weighed retaining the current specifications against modifying them to reduce compatibility risks. They cautioned that a change protecting one set of contracts could disrupt others. Under the existing specifications, activation could occur as early as mid-January 2027. Waiting until January to decide could move it to late February or early March; adopting modifications could push it to April or May. No decision had been reached.

Developers also discussed whether to narrow the scope of the subsequent planned hard fork, Hegotá, to prioritize post-quantum security. A preliminary review of EIP-8151, which is designed to protect accounts migrating to post-quantum security, found that potentially many existing contracts could be affected. No scope decision was reached; client teams were expected to submit positions before further discussions in two weeks.