What would an Ethereum user need to receive funds through a stealth address—and which parts of that process would remain visible on-chain? A working group announced on November 18, 2026, is focusing on the standards, key registration and wallet support behind that question. This account reflects reporting published that day at 21:30 (UTC+8), not completed deployments.
Pierre, described by TechFlow as a member of the Ethereum Foundation’s privacy research effort, announced the Stealth Addresses working group. According to the report, the group’s website names the Ethereum Foundation, Umbra developer ScopeLift, stealth-address wallet Fluidkey and hardware-wallet maker Trezor among its participants. The group plans to meet every two weeks.
The reported work has four strands:
- ERC-5564 and cryptography: The group proposes combining classical elliptic-curve cryptography with ML-KEM, a lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanism, in a hybrid approach intended to address future quantum-related risks to historical transfer privacy.
- An independent implementation: It plans a separate production-grade reference codebase. The report describes two independent reference implementations and a system-level audit as prerequisites for moving ERC-5564 to Final status.
- A mainnet key registry: A proposed singleton contract would provide a common interface for registering and resolving stealth meta-address information across compatible applications, rather than requiring repeated registration in each app. The proposed design also covers separate spending and viewing keys, key rotation and encrypted metadata indexing.
- Hardware-wallet support: The group plans to work with Trezor on key derivation, viewing-key export and signing interfaces for stealth-address use. These are integration goals, not features the report establishes as available in Trezor firmware.
For readers interpreting ledger records, the distinction is between a proposal for managing privacy-related keys and metadata and a deployed system that changes what can be observed on-chain. The report does not provide a deployed registry address, transaction records or test results from which to assess the proposed design’s use or privacy properties.
